But, who is the revolutionary subject today?

Claire Zimmermann
12 min readApr 16, 2021

Because the contemporary world is changing so rapidly, and with the increased means of communication, the rise of social media but also the spaces that are being successively opened up to expressing opinions of oppressions (the #Metoo movement for instance) one can witness how the discussion of revolution is changing. The study of radical politics cannot focus anymore on only one system of oppression that needs to be overthrown but on various ones. Yet, it seems that as the constant awareness and conscience of new systems of oppression, it can be puzzling to acknowledge who is the revolutionary subject, meaning who will be able to bring about the change needed to fight the system of oppression. This is what is at stake in this essay. I will try to figure out who can be the bearer of change in the 21st Century.

First of all, it is important that I lay out the problem I ought to explain. Today, as I have explained there is a variety of individuals that can be categorized as revolutionary subjects. So many, that we cannot identify one particular revolutionary subject. Moreover, as they are also many identified systems of oppression, and not solely one, it is harder to identify who is the revolutionary subject, in the sense of who is the more qualified and knowledgeable to bring about the change of revolution. When we look at the historical literature of radical political theory, the path to revolution is clearly stated out: with identified means to change a situation of oppression, and thus with a clear statement of the individuals that will be able to do this: the revolutionary subject. The most famous one to think about is Marx. Indeed, marxism consisted of the overthrow of the capitalist bourgeois society that governed the state and oppressed the workers, and that had to happen by the proletariat to seize up the means of production from the capitalists, and hence rule for a period of time as a ruling class over the bourgeois (which was the period called « socialism »). Then this society ought to transform into a communist society: a classless society in which the state will no longer have a role, as it was only perpetuating oppression. Therefore, we see here how in Marxist thought, the revolutionary subject is without ambiguity the proletariat: « Of all the classes that stand face to face with the bourgeoisie today, the proletariat alone is a really revolutionary class” (Marx, The Communist Manifesto). But Marx is not the only one who identified a clear revolutionary subject. In Memmi’s book Portrait of the colonized, Memmi constantly talks about « a colonized subject » that can be identified as such. This revolutionary subject is universalized and generalized. It is understood as a homogeneous group that will bring about the change, that is the revolution. In fact, Memmi writes that we can describe the colonized person « actuellement, on peut décrire le colonisé; j’ai essayé de montrer qu’il souffre, juge et se conduit d’une certaine manière » (Memmi, The Portrait of the Colonized p. 162 ). Furthermore, the author talks about a « myth of the colonized ». Therefore, Memmi tried to express that the colonized subject, who is able to change its condition and therefore map out the ‘revolution’ has the same characteristics in every country where there has been a situation of colonization, hence can be universalized. We see this dimension of universality in Marxist thought as well, in which the proletariat will not only unite to seize up the means of production of one country but as an international movement, which will destroy capitalism globally: « in the national struggles of the proletarians of the different countries, they point out and bring to the front of common interests of the entire proletariat, independently of all nationality ». (Marx, The Communist Manifesto) The issue with such a universalized, generalized, and identified revolutionary subject as a homogeneous group is that, first, it is very difficult to unite all the proletariat of every country, and the historical evidence will not contradict me. Second, it is even harder to do so in contemporary societies. As I have said before, they are many identified systems of oppression today, and therefore many potentials revolutionary subjects. Today, even contemporary Marxists recognizes that the world is not divided between two class antagonism, that will grow even wider overtime: the bourgeois versus the proletariat. We cannot really talk about class anymore, as there are many people that are not part of the proletariat nor part of the bourgeois capitalist society. One could argue that the bourgeois capitalist society has grown wider and swallowed up pretty much all segments of the population. But if that is true, who will be able to overthrow this capitalist bourgeois society?

Here, we are left with a puzzling situation: if there is no one identified as the revolutionary subject in contemporary societies, then who is the revolutionary subject? Who will bring about the radical change needed? Most importantly, is there a framework in the literature of radical politics that could help us understand the figure of the revolutionaries as it is standing today, in the 21st Century?

I will argue that there is a need to understand the contemporary revolutionary subject as not the most knowledgable about a situation of oppression, not as being the « most oppressed » but rather as every individual witnessing and experiencing oppression. Hence, drawing on Boggs and the socialist humanist’s view, expressed by Thompson, I argue that every individual is creative enough to bring about the change of revolution, and this is what composed the figure of the revolutionary subject today.

First, we should explore Angela Davis’ framework in Women, Race and Class. Davis’ book is transcending the universalized/ generalized subject one can encounter in Marx or in Memmi. In fact, Davis kind of revolutionized this figure of the revolutionary subject. She argues that the revolution must be carried out by the people that are the most knowledgeable about the situation of oppression. And in the case of her argument, the African American women in the United States. Black women were the individual that suffered the most during slavery, as they happened to be black AND women. Hence, they suffered double oppression. Davis writes: « again, it is important to remember that the punishment inflicted on women exceeded in intensity the punishment suffered by their men, for women were not only whipped and mutilated, they were also raped » (Davis, Women, Race and Class p. 19) Taiwo, a contemporary philosopher that wrote Being-in-the-Room Privilege: Elite Capture and Epistemic Deference would reply that « oppression is not a prep school ». For him, the people that are the most knowledgeable about a situation aren’t always the people that were the most oppressed. Further, putting responsibilities on the people that are thought to have been or are still being the most oppressed is not the solution. He calls this situation, a situation of “epistemic deference”, in which, because the issue at stake is so complex, we spend more time thinking of who can be the best adequate person to resolve the situation, than actually resolving that situation.

While Davis’ framework- that the people that were in the situation of oppression are the best-situated people to change the system of oppression- is insightful, it can be criticized, as we just saw with Taiwo’s argument. But further than that, it also does not really resolve our problem, as they are many people today that could claim to be the most oppressed, and therefore the most qualified to carry out the revolution. Perhaps Angela Davis would reply that every person in the situation of oppression (the queer as being oppressed by the hetero norms; the women oppressed by patriarchal societies, the workers by capitalism) can bring about change. But then we need a framework that can account for this multitude of existing revolutionary subjects.

We, therefore need to turn to Boggs’s argument, for I believe it is very insightful of today’s societies. Boggs, in the American Revolution, rightly describes how contemporary societies are changing faster and faster today. Moreover, they are not only changing quicker, they are also becoming increasingly complex. There is the rise of the internet, which makes it easier for subjects of oppression to realize that they are oppressed, but also to speak out and even organize as subjects of oppression. But Boggs speaks about a new phenomenon that arose and is changing the face of contemporary revolution: it is the rise of automatism. The author departs from the theory of workerism, which is the theory, contra to the disastrous ideology of Lenin, that the revolutionary subject should be the worker himself, that is individuals that are situated within the factory. This theory of workerism is a direct response to Lenin’s argument: that the consciousness of revolution ought to be developed outside the factories, by workers unions or political parties for example. As Lenin, in what is to be done? argues that spontaneous organizations will not allow the revolution to take place, and there is a need for people to lead and direct the movement in a certain direction, workerism argues the exact contrary: that workers are the most knowledgeable and skillful people to bring the change, and spontaneous organization is what is needed. Yet, Boggs departs from this theory of workersim to develop what is known as autonomism. For him, « many people in the United States are aware that, with automation, enough could be easily produced in this country so that there would be no need for the majority of Americans to work » (Boggs, Chapter 4: The outsiders). The increasing new technologies and machinery are increasingly replacing the labor force. Many people are being thrown out of the factories, and this phenomenon will only increase. Boggs depart from this premise and develop his theory of revolution, which I believe is very adequate to the comprehension of the figure of the revolutionary subject today. Indeed, he explains that because the modes of revolution are changing so quickly, as we can see with the description of capitalism that Marx developed, now outdated by the theory of autonomism. Today, the need isn’t that the proletariat seizes up the means of production out of the hands of the bourgeois capitalists in order to govern for a short period of time, before installing a classless society. Today, the proletariat is a class that doesn’t really exist anymore, as many factory workers are now without jobs. Therefore the mode of revolution changes. But so do the revolutionary subject. Indeed, as Boggs describes, the people the most knowledgable are no longer the workers in the factories, but the « outsiders » as he called them. Meaning the people that have lost their jobs due to the rise of automation. This implies that the theory of workerism is outdated. The people that were the leaders of workers’ unions, involved in political parties are the ones that actually know less about the new revolution. The revolutionaries subject cannot be the political parties nor the unions’ militants because « they cannot give up an idea or a method in which depended on for progress until they can see another one, and they have not yet seen or figured out another way to fight for human needs and human rights ». (Boggs, Chap 4)

But if the revolutionary subject cannot be the old workers that were leading the working unions and political parties, then who is it? Here we come back to our interesting puzzle. Yet, Boggs’ theory of autonomism goes beyond explaining that workerism is outdated. I argue that his theory, in the American Revolution, establishes a new framework of who is the bearer of change.

Boggs Chapter 8: The American Revolution

Here, we see that the system of oppression is much larger than the oppression brought by capitalism under Marxist ideology. The oppression, as thought by Boggs, is an oppression that is imposed on every man, by man itself. It is the oppression of believing that we have everything to lose, and therefore do not risk anything, to the extent of leaving politics aside. This paragraph is transcending as it demonstrates that the challenge of the 21st century isn’t to struggle against a particular form of oppression and enslavement, but rather to struggle against all forms of oppression, even the ones we are imposing upon ourselves. This is transcendent as Boggs does not only take into account the various forms of oppression that exist today, he also clearly expresses the figure of the modern revolutionary subject: being every individual. He writes further:

Boggs Chapter 8: The American Revolution

Therefore, we understand that the revolutionary subject can be, and even has to be, every individual. Every individual must struggle against the forms of oppression he witnesses, and against the one he is imposing upon himself, from fear of losing the privileges he thinks he has. But, as Boggs clearly expresses, the privileges one has obscures the potential freedom one can have. In order, to better understand Boggs’ claim, it is useful to turn to the ideas of socialist humanism. E. P Thompson writes that men « want also to change themselves as men. However fitfully and ineffectively, they want other and greater things: they want to stop killing one another: they want to stop this pollution of their spiritual life which runs through society as the rivers carried their sewage and refuse through our nineteenth-century industrial towns: side by side with their direct economic interests, they would like to ‘do benefits’ to each other » (E. P. Thompson Socialist Humanism). The idea of socialist humanism lies in a conception of the human being as an individual desiring and capable of doing good. It departs from the premise that the essence of man is a good one, and is profoundly optimistic of men. Thompson states: « liberate man, as a creative being- and he will create, not only new values, but things in super-abundance » (E. P. Thompson). Therefore, socialist humanism can be sum up by the idea that they are only good men, but bad actions. But that these bad actions can be corrected if a man acquires a conscience of himself as wanting to live peacefully amongst others: « but now men look to something else-not a thing at all, but to the reason ‘and conscience of man’ ». (E. P. Thompson) Finally, « only if men by their own human agency can master this thing will Marx’s optimism be confirmed, and ‘human progress cease to resemble that hideous pagan idol, who would not drink the nectar but the skulls of the slain » (E. P. Thompson). Here, we see a dimension of man as being an individual agent capable and, most importantly, wanting changes. Desiring a society in which no forms of oppression exist, and desiring to live in peace with another.

Although one can critic this idea of socialist humanism as being a utopia, it relies on an important concept: consciousness. The only change man can achieve has to be done through the consciousness of himself as a free individual. Another counter-argument that can be formulated is the belief that socialist humanism departs from a false premise, a false idealization of the essence of man as being good, whereas it can be seen as ‘bad’. Yet, I won’t acknowledge this counter-argument, as I do not believe in it, and I do not take it to be advancing our comprehension of the figure of the revolutionary subject. Indeed, in the literature of radical politics, it is often claimed that the issue has to do with the system of oppression, rather than with the essence of man in itself. Further, what socialist humanism can teach us is the important agency of every individual. Here we see how Boggs draws on socialist humanism in his claim that every individual must struggle individually against his own oppression.

Further, one counter-argument can be drawn from Taiwo. Indeed, Taiwo’s critique of “deference epistemology” departs from the premise that taking an epistemological standpoint is a good way of trying to acknowledge who is the revolutionary subject. In fact, Taiwo’s argument still takes into account that the people that are/ have been situated in an oppressive system have a certain form of knowledge that other people don’t. However, this does not contradict my argument, drawn on Boggs and the socialist humanist viewpoint. Indeed, what formulates Taiwo is not contradictory with the fact that every individual that is in a situation of oppression can be the bearer of change, and further, that every oppressed individual is and will be a bearer of change because of the own nature of men: which is that individual has a creative agency within themselves. Rather, Taiwo even emphasizes in his piece that what is needed in order to resolve complex situations, such as struggles against the oppressive system is that people, being oppressed or rather privileged, work hand in hand together.

Bibliography:

Angela Davis, Women, Race, and Class (1981) https://legalform.files.wordpress.com/2017/08/davis-women-race-class.pdf

Boggs, The American Revolution (1963) https://libcom.org/library/american-revolution-pages-negro-workers-notebook

Lenin, What is to be done (1902) https://www.marxists.org/archive/lenin/works/1901/witbd/

Marx, The Communist Manifesto (1848) https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto/index.htm

Memmi, The Colonizer and the Colonized (1957) https://cominsitu.files.wordpress.com/2020/05/albert-memmi-the-colonizer-and-the-colonized-1.pdf

E. P. Thompson, ‘Socialist Humanism’ (1957) https://www.marxists.org/archive/thompson-ep/1957/sochum.htm

Taiwo, ‘Being-in-the-room Privilege’ (2020) https://www.thephilosopher1923.org/essay-taiwo

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